UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE JUIZ DE FORA
FACULDADE DE ECONOMIA
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ECONOMIA (PPGE)
DISCIPLINA: ***Macroeconomia II***
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Ementa: equilíbrio nos modelos novo-clássico e novo-keynesiano, regras ótimas de política monetária, análise de perda de bem-estar social, independência e transparência dos bancos centrais.

1- Modelo Monetário Clássico e com moeda na utilidade
2-Modelo Novo Keynesiano Básico
3- Desenho de Política Monetária no Modelo Novo Keynesiano Básico
4- *Tradeoff* de Política Monetária: Discricionariedade vs.Comprometimento
5-Independência, Credibilidade, *Accountability* e Transparência do Banco Central
6- Economia Aberta e com Governo nos modelos Novo-Keynesianos

1ª Ementa/avaliações

2ª Fatos estilizados/ Log Linearização

3ª Modelo Monetário Clássico

4ª Modelo Monetário Clássico

5ª Modelo Monetário Clássico com moeda na função de utilidade

6ª Modelo Novo Keynesiano Básico

7ª Modelo Novo Keynesiano Básico

8ª Desenho de Política Monetária no Modelo Novo Keynesiano Básico

9ª *Tradeoff* de Política Monetária: Discricionariedade *vs*.Comprometimento

10ª Independência, Credibilidade, *Accountability* e Transparência do Banco Central

11ª Economia Aberta e com Governo nos modelos Novo-Keynesianos

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